STOCK on the Hard Problem of Consciousness: The Hard Problem Does Not Exist

Brief

The "hard problem of consciousness," as formulated by David Chalmers, stems from a conflation of two distinct phenomena: subjective experiences, such as the "redness" of red (qualia), and consciousness itself. Subjective experiences are the product of material processes, including neural activity, somatic responses (bodily markers), cultural, linguistic, social, and familial norms, habits, and customs, which shape associations and imprints in memory.

These processes create the illusion of "experience," but they can be explained through neuroscience and semantics, requiring no mystical essence. However, consciousness itself is not a biological process; it exists beyond matter, space, and time, remaining fundamentally unknowable. The "hard problem" arises from the erroneous merging of these two aspects.

Rationale

We have agreed that chocolate is tasty. No one truly knows what its taste is in essence, because it is impossible to directly compare your taste of chocolate with mine, but we consider it tasty because we have agreed on this. Even if I am allergic to chocolate, it still remains tasty.

To illustrate, in some cultures, things that might seem strange to others are considered tasty: for example, durian in Southeast Asia is prized as a delicacy, even though its smell is often compared to rotting onions, directly proving the role of cultural agreements in shaping subjective experiences. One might argue that smell is not the same as taste, but the example is clear enough.

We have agreed that light with a wavelength of 700 nm, or RGB code #FF0000, is "red." If I ask an AI to draw a red square and then upload that red square into its query field, asking what color the square is, the AI will respond that the square is red. There is no subjective experience here - just training data and settings. Moreover, if I agree with the AI that it will "perceive" red as red, it can describe it as if it has a subjective experience: "I perceive red as red, but I cannot explain why." Similarly, if I agree with the AI that it will say "this is very tasty" in response to the word "chocolate," or "I feel happy" in response to the word "joy," it will do so, despite having neither taste nor emotions.

Modern AIs, such as Google Vision API, can already recognize colors and shapes, while generative models like DALL-E can create images that the AI "describes" as if it "sees" them. This demonstrates that qualia are a functional process that can be replicated without the need for mystical "subjective experiences." Furthermore, these processes are not necessarily unique to biological systems and can be modeled in AI, confirming their material nature.

Additionally, the Synthetic Theory of Consciousness provides examples of preserved consciousness, such as near-death experiences (NDE), where individuals report retaining consciousness despite severe brain dysfunction, for instance, during coma or clinical death (Cases of Preserved Consciousness (SC)). At the same time, they may lose the sense of taste, color, smell, and other "subjective experiences." These cases confirm that individual consciousness (IC) does not depend on the physical receiver (PR), such as the brain, and support our distinction: “qualia” are tied to material processes, whereas consciousness is not.

David Chalmers argues that even if we explain all the material processes associated with qualia, the "hard problem" remains: why are these processes accompanied by subjective experience?

The answer: “qualia” in this meaning are an illusion created by neural activity, which recalls (considering all the components outlined in the brief) a conditional "red square" in memory. This can be explained through neuroscience and semantics.

We strive for truth, not adaptation to data (Principle #1), and if new data disprove our position, we are prepared to revise the hypothesis, as required by the Synthetic Theory of Consciousness. However, consciousness itself - the capacity that allows so-called "qualia" to be perceived - cannot be reduced to material processes. Consciousness exists beyond biology, space, matter, and time, as asserted by the Synthetic Theory of Consciousness.

Chalmers mistakenly conflates explainable "qualia" with consciousness, creating an artificial problem.

Conclusion

The "hard problem of consciousness," as formulated by David Chalmers, arises from the incorrect conflation of "qualia" and consciousness.

"Qualia" are the product of material processes, such as neural activity, memory, and cultural agreements, and can be explained through neuroscience and functional models, including AI.
Consciousness, on the other hand, exists beyond matter, space, and time, and its nature, as well as its connection to the material world, is reliably described by the Synthetic Theory of Consciousness.

Instead of focusing on an artificial "mystery," we should separate these two aspects: investigate "qualia" as a material phenomenon and acknowledge that consciousness lies beyond the realm of matter, space, and time. This approach will prevent us from getting stuck in philosophical dead ends.

The "hard problem of consciousness," as formulated by David Chalmers, arises from the erroneous conflation of "qualia" and consciousness.

"Qualia" are the product of material processes, such as neural activity, memory, and cultural agreements, and can be explained through neuroscience and functional models, including AI. Consciousness, however, according to the Synthetic Theory of Consciousness, exists beyond matter, space, and time.

The theory asserts that individual consciousness persists "on the other side" after death (Time Dimension: T3, Disconnect (DC)), which underscores Chalmers’ mistake: his "mystery" pertains to "qualia," which are explainable, rather than to the nature of consciousness itself.

Instead of focusing on an artificial "mystery," we should separate these two aspects: investigate "qualia" as a material phenomenon and acknowledge that consciousness lies beyond matter, space, and time, as described in the ontological justification of the Theory (Appendix 1). This approach will prevent us from getting mired in philosophical dead ends.